From a theological and spiritual protest, Lutheranism had been allowed to grow into `organized Churches'. The Order's years of vagrancy coincided by and large with the moderate progress of the Reformation, whose devastating effects on Hospitaller estates would be experienced in their fullest magnitude after 1530.

  The third factor was the challenge offered by the formidable power of an expanding Ottoman Empire. On 28-29 August 1521, Belgrade, the `outer wall of Christendom', was treacherously forced into surrender by the young sultan's large and well equipped army on his first campaign. The débâcle extinguished at one stroke the false perceptions hitherto entertained of Suleyman by the Western Powers (including Venice) as an unwarlike and peace-loving ruler.2 Having reconfirmed peace with Venice by treaty of 11 December 1521, Suleyman's next target was the strategically-placed island of Rhodes. It simply lay in the logic of the empire's expansion. Although Mehmed II had failed in a vast attempt upon the fortress forty years earlier, its conquest had now become `both easier and more necessary' in view of the Ottoman establishment in Syria and Egypt since their prestigious conquest of 1516-17. The western powers were too fully occupied with their own affairs to assist the Hospitallers. In the winter of 1522, therefore, Europe watched the Rhodian fortifications quake and shake slowly towards destruction by the Ottomans, as it would by `the young king (Louis II) and the unruly nobility of Hungary' in 1526. On 26 August that year, the battle of the Mohacs stretched the Ottoman front to the very domains of the Habsburgs. In 1529 Vienna was under siege.

  In a sense, these three factors mutually re-inforced one another. While the Lutheran revolt and the ensuing struggle which it provoked within traditional Christian unity invited Charles's `unrelenting hostility'3, Suleyman's attacks upon central Europe and the attitude of

certain German princes helped foster Lutheranism. Added to these, the Venetians' fear of conflict with the Grand Signore, who most uncomfortably shared with them some two thousand miles of borderland, was an insuperable obstacle to the crusade as envisaged by Hadrian VI or by his wavering successor Clement VII. This spirit of dissension, so widespread and pervasive throughout Europe, could not spare leaving its evil effects on the internal affairs of the Order of St John too.

A crisis of the highest calibre

  The experience of 1522 constituted for the Order not only a profound crisis, but one of the highest calibre. It was a crisis of identity in the first place, one which questioned the institution's relevance to contemporary Christendom; indeed, its material and physical capacity to continue to realize its traditional raison d'être. The Pope's fear of the extension of imperial power in Northern Italy forced him to take sides in the struggle and in December 1524 he concluded a treaty with Francis I against Charles V, seriously damaging the papacy's traditional neutrality. It shook one of the most delicate principles which the Order had so religiously endeavoured over the years to observe. It was this threat to its neutrality which gradually began to promote dissension among the `national' constituent elements within the Order, later also evident in the narrow streets of Birgu. It was a crisis which witnessed the debilitating trend of having Hospitaller estates in various parts of Europe confiscated, their sources of revenue exploited for the warlike ends of kings, popes, and princes - as happened, for example, with some of the Order's property in Portugal, Naples, Savoy, and elsewhere. It was a crisis which paralysed the generally smooth functioning channels of administration, breaking up the necessary ties of communication between the central conventual authority and the peripheral prioral organization. Once such vital organs stopped functioning, the crisis


[2] See K. M. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571). 4 vols. Philadelphia 1984.
[3] G.R. Elton, Reformation Europe, 1517-1559: Fontana History of Europe (London 1963), 37. 03.
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